James’s claim that truth is what pays off and furthers our thinking was not merely criticized and rejected. Rather, it aroused the disdain of entire communities of German and English philosophers. But these critics have neither read nor completely understood: James did not argue for a nihilistic, deflationary theory of truth. On the contrary, he even allows for the possibility of ‘absolute truths’ and thus differs from today's deflationists and their stance on truth.
This paper shows that, above all, James is concerned with the psychodynamical force of true beliefs and its consequences for an epistemology. This feature of truth lies in the realm of experience: We all experience truth through the impact it has on our thinking, perception, and emotions. Truths are perceived in such a way that they shape and guide our thinking and experiences. One could argue that truths open us, making us susceptible to new experiences and to other people.
This psychodynamical and pragmatic view on truth has its origin in James’s psychology, for instance in his conception of all thinking and feeling being in constant flux (‘stream of consciousness’). Yet, some questions remain: Is it possible, as James claims, to make truth perceptible by guiding this stream of consciousness? In how far can such a subjectivist conception of truth be maintained? Can the entire range of human truth be understood in this way? These questions, however, are of a different kind and thus have to be discussed in a different paper.